What Conflicts Continue as Russia Moves to Dominate Again
Russian foreign policy is likely to continue to dominate global news headlines this year after a tense 2021.
Russia'southward armed services build-upward on the Ukrainian border has set the world on edge, raising fears of an invasion.
In neighboring Republic of belarus, the Kremlin has moved closer to fully-fledged integration with the country, whose embattled strongman President Alexander Lukashenko looks increasingly isolated from the West.
Looking west, the jailing of Kremlin-critic Alexei Navalny farther strained relations with Europe, while across the Atlantic, the ballot of Joe Biden fundamentally changed the course of American strange policy toward Russia.
Russia also tried to extend its global footprint, by cooperating with post-coup Myanmar and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
And as the world continued to struggle with the coronavirus pandemic, Russia attempted to heave its global image through "vaccine diplomacy," but inconsistent vaccine production and a murky middle-man selling vaccines in the developing world ultimately led to a cord of scandals that did Russia'south reputation more harm than skillful.
What does Russia hope to achieve in 2022? The Moscow Times asked ten leading experts in Russian strange policy to requite their predictions for the coming twelvemonth.
Russia-Cathay relations will deepen in 2022
Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center
Ii years of the pandemic have shown the resilience of Russia-China ties.
In 2021, merchandise volume grew to most $140 billion, setting another celebrated record.
This figure reflects not simply high bolt prices this year, merely also increased shipments of natural gas via the "Ability of Siberia" pipeline and growth in volumes of Russian coal exports to China.
In 2022 this tendency is likely to go along, although verbal merchandise volumes volition be subject to volatile global prices. Every bit China shifts away from domestic coal to cleaner fuels like gas, and Russia seeks to monetize its natural resources, Moscow and Beijing might find more than joint projects.
Some of them will be unveiled during Vladimir Putin's trip to Beijing in February, with a new contract for the "Power of Siberia ii" gas pipeline as the crown precious stone. The political surround is as well benevolent to the further deepening of China-Russia ties. Moscow's disharmonize with the West is non going away, as demonstrated past contempo events in Ukraine, raising the prospect of more than U.S. and EU sanctions against Russian federation.
Beijing's confrontation with the U.S. is also hither to stay, even if the White Firm gets distracted by events in Europe or elsewhere. Despite some predictions, Prc-Russia entente is far from its top, and 2022 is likely to serve as another testament to this.
Keeping the Heart Eastward "stable in its instability"
Mariana Belenskaya, Middle East correspondent for the Russian daily Kommersant
It seems that Russian foreign policy is no longer focused on the Heart East, as information technology was for several years after the start of the military campaign in Syria. Russia is now moving along a familiar path — the situation is "stable in its instability" merely Moscow has restored its authority in the region, established ties and assigned roles. The general task for adjacent yr is to increase trade with the countries of the region — including past expanding the grain market place — and maintaining involvement in Russian weapons.
Syria, which will remain Russian federation's zone of responsibleness for many years to come, is still a split set of issues. It is important that the pacified territories exercise not once once again turn into hotbeds of confrontation and that no global powers initiate new operations in the country. In add-on, Russia hopes that Syrian arab republic will gradually sally from its international isolation. For its part, Moscow will go along trying to rebuild Syria'southward infrastructure, at to the lowest degree to the extent that it can practice so alone.
Russian federation might need to pay close attention to Libya, where it remains unclear how events volition develop. Moscow maintains close contact with all the parties in the Libyan disharmonize but does not seek a fundamental role in resolving the bug there — at least for as long as the situation does non become critical.
Two regional problems will require detail attention side by side year — the "Iranian nuclear dossier" and Transitional islamic state of afghanistan. The latter has become more than strongly linked to the Eye East now that Turkey and Qatar have taken an interest in it.
Every bit for Islamic republic of iran, Moscow will practice everything in its power to bring all parties back to the Islamic republic of iran nuclear deal — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — equally it existed prior to Washington's withdrawal from it in 2018. Indeed, the answer to the question of whether a Nuclear Deal 2.0 volition appear and how information technology volition look largely depends on how events will transpire in the Middle Eastward and what role each political party in the region will play.
Peace in Ukraine is a victory in itself
Andrei Kortunov, director-general of the Russian International Diplomacy Council
Information technology is hard to envisage a breakthrough or fifty-fifty significant progress in relations between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. The definition of success would be the ability of the sides to avert directly military confrontation in Donbass, in the Azov Sea or along the Russian-Ukrainian border. The current political dynamic between Kiev and in Moscow is not conducive to the flexibility needed to move ahead with the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. At the aforementioned time, the change of government in Germany and the forthcoming presidential election in France make it very hard for the European members of the Normandy process to practise the leadership needed to overcome the current stalemate.
I could wait the Biden administration to become a more active actor in the situation effectually Ukraine in 2022, but the odds are that White House attention volition be focused on ongoing U.South.-China rivalry and the Ukrainian crunch volition remain a relatively low priority for Washington. Yet, de-escalation is possible, as well as a new Russian-Ukrainian agreement for gas transit. If these modest goals are achieved in 2022, we might meet less hostile and belligerent rhetoric coming out of Moscow and Kiev.
Further uneasy integration with Lukashenko in Belarus
Artyom Shraibman, Belarussian journalist and political commentator for the Carnegie Moscow Center
Russian federation's strategic goals in Republic of belarus have remained unchanged for many years. Moscow, at minimum, wants to prevent the rapprochement of Minsk with the West, and at maximum, to strengthen its own influence in Belarus, which could outlive Alexander Lukashenko.
Further institutionalization of such dependence will be the program for 2022. This includes promoting bilateral integration inside the Marriage Country, increasing Russian military presence in Belarus, and "helping" Minsk to reorient its merchandise flows toward Russia in response to Western sanctions. Not all of those ambitions will necessarily materialize, equally Lukashenko retains some bargaining power.
For several years now, Moscow has been approaching financial back up for Lukashenka conservatively. The book of indirect subsidies, discounts on gas and oil and loans are either decreasing or non growing. The Kremlin gives Lukashenko equally much equally is necessary to keep his regime adrift, but the idea of more generous investment in Belarus has long been unpopular in Moscow.
At the same time, one should not expect Putin to exert tough pressure on Lukashenko in order to speed up the transfer of power in Belarus. At best, the Kremlin might be ready to button the friendly authorities toward controlled transformation, but Russians will non actively undermine Lukashenko'south dominion.
Moscow'southward long-continuing problem with Republic of belarus is the lack of reliable alternatives to Lukashenko.
Despite Biden-Putin respect, Ukraine means a bumpy ride in relations with America
Vladimir Frolov, political columnist and one-time Russian diplomat
In 2022, the U.S. and Russian federation will test the resilience of the respectful adversarial relationship they have transitioned to after the Geneva meridian last June.
"The spirit of Geneva" has helped keep confrontation at an acceptable level through dialogue on strategic stability and cyber threats and with regular interaction between national security advisors.
The presidential talks have demonstrated grudging respect and an power to communicate grievances and threats conspicuously, but calmly, while opening new avenues for dialogue.
Washington dangles inconclusive talks to curb Russian unpredictability, while Moscow views engaging with Biden as the all-time way to accost Russia'due south long-ignored concerns without changing course.
There is fifty-fifty a rare U.Southward.-Russian federation listen-meld over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran nuclear deal negotiations, with Iran's intransigence providing the incentives.
Disagreements, however, will remain. The stand up-off over bilateral diplomatic presence has degenerated into the grotesque, with spy agencies unable to agree on rules for adequate espionage activity. Resolving the impasse will crave Moscow to remove its designation of the U.S. every bit a "hostile power."
Ukraine, NATO enlargement and Russia'southward rightful place in the European security society will remain the central battlegrounds in 2022.
Moscow harbors great expectations after Biden's promise to discuss Russia's concerns over NATO enlargement "among the 5 major NATO allies" signaling acceptance of Moscow's preferred format on European security.
In Ukraine, Russia's demands have moved across the implementation of the Minsk agreements and are at present in "Finlandization territory." Moscow'due south insistence on legally binding guarantees of the definitive finish to NATO enlargement in the former Soviet Union has narrowed the telescopic for confront-saving affairs.
Biden volition accept a short time frame in 2022 to negotiate an acceptable accommodation with Putin on Ukraine and European security. Russia'southward posture is unlikely to change before significant diplomatic progress towards meeting Moscow's objectives. It volition be a crude ride.
Crucial elections in Latin America could tilt the residue of power in Russia's favor
Vladimir Rouvinski, professor at Icesi University in Colombia
In 2021, Russian federation managed to position itself as one of the major suppliers of the Covid-19 vaccine to the region, although mainly supporting countries with friendly relations to Moscow
Meanwhile, central Russia ally President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, non simply survived 2021 simply as well started strengthening his position in the region thank you to a new left-wing wave on the continent.
In the coming twelvemonth, Russia will exist closely watching several important presidential elections, including Colombia, where a left-wing candidate is projected to be the likely winner. In Brazil, the very popular left-wing one-time president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is expected to denote his bid for the presidency in early 2022. Wins for both left-wing candidates will dramatically change the Latin American political map and open up new opportunities for Moscow to strengthen its ties in the Western Hemisphere.
However, Russia also faces challenges. Ane of them is the shortage of tangible resources to support its allies in this part of the world. This is most evident in Cuba, where the situation is deteriorating rapidly and Moscow has so far provided minimal assistance. The continuous tensions with Washington over Ukraine may incentivize reciprocity-driven Russia to pay more than attention to Cuba, located only 129 kilometers (eighty miles) from the U.S border.
No easy answers in Europe
Anton Barbashin, editorial director of Riddle Russia
Information technology is almost impossible, looking at the end of 2021, to see a vivid time to come for European union-Russia relations in 2022. The all-time case scenario is that they won't become much worse.
We can point to 3 major themes that will ascertain this relationship side by side year — Ukraine, Belarus and the time to come of gas. In each of these cases the Eu's goal is to minimize damage, while Russia volition undoubtedly be ready to up the risk-taking, assuming the EU volition exist the first to blink.
The most heated and potentially most devastating is the tension over Ukraine and the role of NATO in European security. While Moscow certainly blames Paris and Berlin for failing to printing Minsk 2 and is now betting on Washington, it volition be the European union that will have to choice upward what's left after the likely fallout.
The accident might be softened by prompt Nord Stream 2 certification, only as of now it looks like stable gas prices are not in the basic scenario for 2022.
Peaceful or not, 2022 volition non exist relaxing.
Volition the Arctic remain the sole region of cooperation in 2022?
Elizabeth Buchanan, lecturer in strategic studies with Deakin University at the Australian State of war College
Will 2022 mark the terminate of the Chill'south "low tension" post-Cold War run or will the Arctic remain "isolated" from Russian-Western strategic tensions elsewhere? Pundits worldwide will no doubt go along a watchful eye on any potential spillover from Russian federation'due south current Ukraine trajectory into the Arctic.
Since 2014, Russian-Western ties in the Arctic have remained largely cooperative, indeed even collaborative via multilateral vehicles similar the Arctic Quango.
Russia knows that the future economical resource base of the land does not rest on its Eastern European doorstep, merely on its Arctic frontier. Plunging the Russian Arctic Zone into conflict is therefore not part of Russian federation'southward strategic playbook. Working to silo the Arctic from tensions far across the region volition remain a lynchpin of Kremlin security planning and outlook.
The real geopolitical and strategic gains and achievements for Moscow in the Arctic will remain nested in Russia's bilateral energy engagements. In 2022, I expect an enhanced diversification strategy with regard to Russia's economic partners and stakeholders in its various Arctic energy ventures. Bilateral Arctic ties with India will be central to offsetting whatever Russian overreliance on Chinese capital.
Russia will endeavour to gain from the Taliban'southward threat in Central Asia
Temur Umarov, research consultant at Carnegie Moscow Center focusing on Central Asia
In 2022, security concerns in Afghanistan will continue to be the priority for Moscow in Primal Asia. Russia will see a window of opportunity to regain its reputation — which is being challenged by China — as the only reliable security guarantor in Central Asia against the uncertainties that the Taliban authorities brings.
This means that in the upcoming year Russia will intensify its cooperation with the security agencies in Central Asian nations. Russia will also be hoping to push through its integration projects with countries previously skeptical of joining. Uzbekistan, for instance, is now seriously considering joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.
Overall, Russian federation's leadership will want to see a stable and safe Central Asia in the adjacent several years. The closer we move toward 2024 presidential elections, the less free energy the Kremlin will have for anything other than its domestic issues.
Moscow will therefore try its all-time to help the political leaders in Central Asia to become stronger and more than stable. Yet, this is non going to be an like shooting fish in a barrel chore, especially in Kyrgyz republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
More than than symbolism at the 2022 Russia-Africa Summit
Andrey Maslov, head of the Center for African Studies at Moscow'southward Higher School of Economics, with researcher for Intexpertise LLC Sviridov Vsevolod
The volume of Russian-African merchandise increased this year for the start fourth dimension since 2018, diversifying both geographically and in the range of appurtenances traded. Shipments of railway equipment, fertilizers, pipes, high-tech equipment and aluminum are growing and work continues on institutionalizing the interaction between Russia and the African Spousal relationship.
The second Russia-Africa Summit is planned for 2022. In February it will be appear where and when information technology will be held — most likely in Russia in November — and in which format. Preparations for the second pinnacle will shape the Russian-African agenda, visits will become more frequent and Africa volition receive greater coverage in Russian media.
Instead of measuring the success of the summit by how many African leaders attended, equally happened in 2019, the parties will finally give greater attention to the substance of the agenda, which is already under evolution.
Russia will endeavour to increase its presence in Africa while avoiding straight confrontation with other non-regional players.
A number of conflicts are also causing alarm, primarily those in Federal democratic republic of ethiopia and in Republic of mali, from which France and the EU are withdrawing their troops. In 2022, Russia will try in diverse means to play a stabilizing function for Africa and assist in confronting the main challenges it faces — epidemics, the spread of extremism and conflicts, and hunger.
A dialogue volition besides brainstorm on Africa formulating its ain climate agenda. Africa is outset to empathize that it does not need a European-style greenish agenda and will demand compensation from the main polluting countries for the damage the climatic changes accept caused to the ecosystems of African countries. Russia is likely to back up these demands.
Source: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/03/foreign-policy-experts-map-russias-plans-for-2022-a75845
Source: https://andersontrainty.blogspot.com/2022/03/what-conflicts-happened-after-russia.html
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